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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD ·COM·PANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7701 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company will be re-
ferred to throughout this brief as the "Short Line"; the 
Union P·acific Railroad Company, as "Union Pacific"; The 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, as "Rio 
Grande"; and italics and other emphasis throughout is 
supplied by the writer of this brief, unless otherwise noted. 
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Except for the statement contained in the first two 
paragraphs at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 
of appellant's brief, respondent disagrees with the facts as 
stated by appellant; or, more particularly, it might be said 
that appellant has misstated some of the facts and has 
stated as facts conclusions that are not warranted by the 
pleadings or evidence in the case. Therefore, except for 
adopting said first two paragraphs, respondent will give a 
further statement of facts involved in this case. 
The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is a Utah 
corporation which owns a line of railroad, which, insofar as 
may be material in this case, extends from McCammon, 
Idaho, to Sandy, Utah (R. 16·6). In addition to its road-
bed and terminals, and contrary to the claim of appeHant 
throughout the case, the Short Line does at the present 
time (or as of April 1, 19'51) own rolling stock, including 
something in excess of 2,000 freight cars, a little less than 
100 passenger cars, and 134 locomotive engines (R. 122-
125; Ex. W, X, Y, and AA). 
Although the Short Line has been in existence as a 
railroad corporation for a considerable period in excess 
of fifty years (Ex. A) and has opera ted as such through 
the states of Utah and Idaho and elsewhere, nevertheless 
it did, under the effective date of January 1, 1936, lease 
its entire railroad properties to the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company (Ex. C). That lease is now in force and effect 
and has not been terminated in any way (R. 86). Appel-
lant stated that the lease was for one hundred years but 
the evidence shows the contrary. The lease itself (Ex. C) 
provides (Sec. 8, page 8) : 
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''8. TERM O·F LEASE 
"This lease shall become effective on the first 
day of January, 1936, and shall continue in effect 
until December 31, 1936, and from year to year 
thereafter until terminated by either party, by at 
least three months' notice in writing of its election 
to terminate the same at the end of the calendar 
year then current, and either party shall have the 
right to terminate this lease as aforesaid. This lease 
and the provisions of the several sections hereof 
shall be construed as if, for each year, a separate 
lease was made and entered into containing the pro-
visions hereof, but only for the fixed term of one 
year, and all of the payments to be made by Lessee 
under any of the several sections of this lease shall 
constitute rental for the year in which the Lessee 
shall become obligated to make the same." 
Thus, the lease is nothing more than a year-to-year lease 
subject to termination at any time by either party by the 
giving of three months' notice. 
Said lease further provides (Sec. 5, page 5) : 
"* * * The Lessee assumes and agrees to 
perform and observe all obligations of the Lessor 
under any and all leases, trackage contracts, fran-
chises, ordinances, easements, licenses and other con-
tracts demised, assigned and transferred to the Les-
see by this lease, or to which the demised premises 
or any part thereof may be subject; provided that 
all expenditures by the Lessee in performance of 
any of the aforesaid obligations which are charge-
able to investment accounts shall be charged to and 
reimbursed by the Lessor, and that any moneys or 
other considerations received by the Lessee under 
any of said leases and contracts which are properly 
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creditable to investment accounts shall inure to and 
become the property of the Lessor." 
* * * * * 
"The Lessee agrees to operate the demised prem-
is·es and to maintain the same in a proper state of 
repair, and to bear all cost and expense thereof 
chargeable to operating expenses. * * *" 
With specific reference to additions or betterments, 
new trackage or other improvements on the railroad, with 
specific reference to condemnation as is involved in this 
case, the lease provides : 
"The Lessee shall have the right to construct or 
acquire any additions to and betterments or exten-
sions of the demised premises which it may deem 
desirable in the interest of the demised premises 
as a whole or advantageous in the operation thereof. 
All such additions, betterments and extensions made 
upon or to any part of the demised premises owned 
by the Lessor shall become and be a part of the 
demised premises and the property of the Lessor 
and the Lessor shall reimburse the Lessee to the 
extent of the cost incurred by it therefor chargeable 
to property investment accounts. Upon the request 
of the Lessee, from time to time, the Lessor will, 
to the extent of its rights and powers, permit to be 
instituted and prosecuted in its name proceedings 
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain or 
otherwise for the acquisition of additional property, 
rights of way, rights to cross, intersect or connect 
with other railroads, * * * or public highways, 
which shall be deemed necessary or desirable for the 
purpose of additions to or betterments or extensions 
of the demised premises. * * * For the purpose 
of reimbursing the Lessee for the cost of additions 
to and betterments and extensions of the demised 
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premises chargeable to the Lessor, less credits upon 
abandonment, retirement, destruction and sales of 
property, under the foregoing provisions of this ar-
ticle, the Lessor, from time to time during the term 
of this lease, '\viii, subject to any necessary govern-
mental approval, upon request of the Lessee, make, 
execute, issue and deliver to the Lessee in such 
amounts as may be necessary for the purpose afore-
said bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, 
as the Lessee shall elect, bearing such rates of inter-
est and payable at such times as. the parties hereto 
shall determine, and, if so requested by the Lessee, 
secured by mortgage upon the demised premises or 
any part thereof." 
On page 3 of his brief counsel for the appellant states 
that the Short Line has no other officers, agents or em-
ployes "excepting only F. ·C. Paulsen * * * who is 
* * * general manager · * * * but whose sole func-
tion as such has been and is the signing of leases for the 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company." Counsel does not 
state the facts or the record properly. The evidence con-
cerning Mr. Paulsen is that he is General Manager of the 
Union Pacific, as well as the Oregon Short Line, properties 
within the State of Utah and the designation as general 
manager in and of itself would indicate that he would have 
such rights and duties as normally would be exercised· by 
any general manager. Counsel for appellant attempted to 
infer by his questionings of the witnesses that as general 
manager he had nothing to do, but the only testimony with 
respect thereto was that of Mr. Bachman, who stated with 
respect to his duties, "Primarily it is to execute leases and 
contracts on behalf of the corporate property, the corporate 
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company,1 the Short Line" ( R. 87) . This testimony, in spite 
of what counsel made an attempt to infer from it, does not 
say that that was his "sole function". With respect to 
other officers, contrary to what appellant states on page 
3, the Short Line does have other officers. Arthur E. 
Stoddard is President of the Short Line and Ambrose J. 
Seitz is Vice-President of the Short Line (R. 82, 83). E. 
G. Smith is Secretary of the Short Line, as well as Secre-
tary of the Union Pacific (R. 101). Thus, the testimony 
is without dispute that the Short L~ine does have other offi-
cers, including not only the ones referred to but also in-
cluding a board of directors, which is active in the conduct 
and management of the affairs of the Short Line, as shown 
by Exhibit F. 
·Counsel for appellant has made several conclusions 
which we do not think are warranted· by the evidence, and 
then has taken such conclusions as a premise to argue from 
and thereby, in our opinion, entirely confuses or attempts 
to confuse the issue in this case. On page 2· of his brief he 
states, first, that the Short Line is a Utah corporation and 
then, as a conclusion, states, "but that it has not operated 
as a common carrier in any particular since January 1, 
1936." Again, on page 3 of his brief ·he states, "Since 
January 1, 1936, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company 
has not carried any freight or passengers or engaged in 
any activities whatever as a common carrier". In his state-
ment of points, paragraph 1, at the bottom of page 3, he 
states that the court should have found that it "has not 
been since January 1, 1936, engaged as a common carrier". 
Then, on page 4 of his brief, counsel states a conclusion as 
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a single question of law and the "point upon which appel-
lant relies for reversal of judgment" that "a corporation 
does not have the power of eminent domain as a railroad 
corporation under Utah lavv unless it is engaged as a com-
mon carrier". This is appellant's premise, and is a false 
premise and counsel does not anywhere throughout the 
entire course of his brief cite even one case to support 
such a proposition. 
Under this "point upon which appellant relies" counsel 
states three propositions for argument. We will answer 
the three points as set out in counsel's argument to the 
extent that we feel they must necessarily be answered but, 
in addition to the three points posed for argument by coun-
sel, we wish to set forth a fourth point for argument which, 
in our opinion, is the main issue in the case and which is 
the one issue which counsel has stressed from the first day 
pleadings were filed in the case, regardless of his present 
attempt to becloud the issues, and that point, or main issue, 
is: Does a railroad corporation, lawfully incorporated 
under the laws of the state and which has operated railroad 
properties and has operated a railroad as such for many 
years, cease to be a railroad or a railroad corporation by 
virtue of leasing its properties to another railroad and 
does it by such lease cease to have the power or authority 
to exercise eminent domain under the laws of the State 
of Utah? Respondent contends and will argue, to the point 
that the plaintiff and respondent by virtue of its lease to 
Union Pacific did not lose its right to prosecute condemna-
tion and that plaintiff and respondent as it is presently cir-
cumstanced is authorized to prosecute this action in con-
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demnation within the State of Utah. Incidental thereto and 
by way of answer to other points raised by appellant, re-
spondent does and will continue to insist that the Short 
Line is a common carrier, although being a common car-
rier is not one of the requisites. necessary to entitle it to 
eminent domain under the Utah law. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS FOR ARGUMENT 
I. 
A CORPORATION DOES NOT BECOME A 
COMMON CARRIER BY LEGSLAT'IVE FIAT, 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER OR 
PROVISIONS OF ITS CHARTER. IT MUST 
HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH IN LAW 
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE STAT·US OF A 
COMMON CARRIER. BUT UTAH LAW DOES 
NOT REQUIRE A CORPORATION TO BE A 
COMMON CARRIER TO ENTITLE IT TO 
BRING AND PROSECUTE CONDEMNATION 
PROCEEDINGS. 
II. 
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTES AND CASES 
THE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUBLIC PUR-
POSE. 
III. 
A RAILROAD COMPANY CANNOT CONDEMN 
LAND FOR USES NOT CONNECTED WITH 
THE CONDUCT OF ITS BUSINESS OR RE-
MOTE FROM PROPERTIES OWNED BY IT. 
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IV. 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT BY LEASING 
ITS PROPERTIES TO THE UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD COMPANY DID NOT LOSE ITS 
RIGHT TO CONDEMN, AND PLAINTIFF AND 
RESPONDENT DOES HAVE POWER AND 
AUTHORITY TO BRING AND PROSECUTE 
THIS CONDEMNATION ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A CORPORATION DOES NOT BECOME A 
COMMON CARRIER BY LEGSLATIVE FIAT, 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER OR 
PROVISIONS OF ITS CHARTER. IT MUST 
HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH IN LAW 
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE STAT·us OF A 
COMMON CARRIER. BUT UTAH LAW DOES 
NOT REQUIRE A CORPORATION TO BE A 
COMMON CARRIER TO ENTITLE IT TO 
BRING AND PROSECUTE CONDEMNATION 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Respondent will agree with .the first sentence of ap-
pellant's first point, which is that a corporation does not 
become a common carrier by legislative fiat, public service 
commission order or by provisions of its charter. The only 
thing we would answer to such an argument is, "So what." 
The right of eminent domain under the Utah laws is not 
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given to common carriers, and the appellant is wrong in 
assuming that the question of whether a corporation is or is 
not a common carrier is a prerequisite or something that 
must be shown as a basis to entitle it to condemnation, and 
none of the cases. cited by counsel states, or even tends to 
support, such a proposition. Therefore, we must disagree 
with the second sentence of appellant's first point of argu-
ment if appellant ~contends that a corporation must be a 
common carrier to entitle it to condemnation. We will agree 
that neither a corporation nor an individual can be either in 
law or in fact a common carrier unless such corporation or 
individual holds itself or himself out to the public as. being 
willing to undertake for hire to transport persons or com-
modities generally for the entire public, or has been so 
engaged in trans.porting and holding out to transport for the 
pubic generally. The case of McCarthy v. Publc Service 
Commission, 111 Utah 481, 184 P. 2d 220, had no reference 
whatsoever to condemnation but merely held that neither 
the public service commission nor anyone else could de·clare 
a person (including corporation in such designation as per-
son) to be a common carrier as a result of past perform-
ances. unless he had actually transported for the public gen-
erally and held himself out to transport for the public 
generally. When there has been no past performan0e show-
ing such a person to be a common carrier, the court stated 
that a need would have to be shown from which the com-
mission could find public convenience and necessity for such 
a person or corporation to offer his or its services and hold 
out to the public to transport generally. Again, we say 
there was. no_ question of condemnation but merely the point 
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that a common carrier is one who holds. himself out to carry 
generally for the public or who is engaged in a general pub-
lic service, with the right of the public to use his facilities. 
The case of State v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237, 
goes to the same point and involves merely a question as to 
whether there was sho,vn in the case the element of public 
service necessary to show that Nelson, who was charged with 
being a common carrier, was serving and carrying all per-
sons indiscriminately or indifferently who had applied for 
transportaton. Nelson, not having held himself out or en-
gaged in such business, was not a common carrier. 
The case of Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P. 2d 571, is to the same e.ffect, 
and the power company involved in that case was. held not 
to be subject to the commission's jurisdiction because "it 
does not propose to servi·ce the public generally but only to 
serve its members." 
We assume that counsel ·cited or intended to cite and 
quote from these cases in an attempt to show that the 
Short Line does not hold itself out to serve the public 
generally or does. not serve the public generally and there-
fore is not a common carrier. Appellant must still show the 
connection and show wherein it is necessary, under the laws 
of the State of Utah, to be a common carrier to entitle one 
to prosecute an action in condemnation, but this respondent 
did not in any manner show. 
While we admit the statement that a corporation does 
not become a common carrier by legislative fiat, public 
service commisson order or by provisions of its charter, we 
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think that a different rule would apply with respect to a 
constitutional provision, and we also wish to point out in 
this case that both by our constitution and by statutes in the 
State of Utah railroads are placed in a somewhat different 
category than other corporations, both with respect to gen-
eral law and to the laws governing eminent domain. By the 
very grant of its ~corporate ·charter a railroad corporation 
has imposed upon it certain duties. and responsibilities which 
continue to be duties and obligatons of such ralroad corpora-
tion as long as it continues to be a corporation, regardless of 
whether it leases its. properties to some other company for 
operation or not, and, different from other corporations, 
railroad corporations are declared by our Utah Constitution 
to be common carriers and all properties·. and franchises 
owned and held by them within the state must be at all times 
kept available to perform common carrier se·rvice, whether 
by the railroad corppration which owns the property or by 
another who operates it as agent or contractor. Elliott on 
Railroads, Third Edition, Section 2, page 6, states with re-
spect to railroads: 
"* * * They are now usually organized un-
der general laws. They are given certain perogative 
franchises and privileges for public purposes in re-
turn for which the state retains. a right of supervision 
and control, in excess of that exercised over purely 
private corporations. In the very grant of the fran-
chise there is, in effect, an implied condition that it 
shall be held as a public or quasi public trust * * * ." 
Section 43, page 75: 
"Railroads, by whomsoever constructed or own-
ed or operated, are quasi public works and are often 
likened by the courts and writers to public highways. 
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The constitution and laws of some states declare 
them to be public highways ; those of others declare 
the companies to be common carriers whose roads are 
available to all persons for the transportation of 
themselves and their property. This latter defini-
tion expresses most nearly the relation of a com-
pleted railroad to the public." 
Section 12 of Article XII of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah provides : 
"All railroad and other transportation com-
panies are declared to be common carriers, and sub-
ject to legislative control; * * *" 
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides: 
"No corporation shall lease or alienate any fran-
chise, so as to relieve the franchise or property held 
thereunder from the liabilities of the lessor, or 
grantor, lessee, or grantee, contracted or incurred in 
operation, use or enjoyment of such franchise or 
any of its privileges." 
Whitman v. Northern Central Railway Co. (Md.), 127 
A. 112. In this case the appellate court of Maryland had 
before it directly, as one of the main points of appeal, the 
question as to whether or not the Northern Central, which 
had leased all of its properties, to the Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company, was or could be considered as a common carrier. 
The case was not a condemnation case but did involve direct-
ly the question as~ to whether or not such a lessor railroad 
continued, nevertheless, to be a common carrier. The opinion 
states: 
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"In 1914 the Northern Central Railway Com-
pany leased that entire system to the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company for 999 years. * * *" 
The lease in question had many provisions similar to the 
lease involved in this. case. We quote from the opinion, after 
the recital of the facts : 
"Upon these facts, the appellant contends: First, 
that the appellee is not a carrier * * * 
"The contention that the appellee is not a car-
rier is based upon the theory that since under the 
lease the actual work of transporting persons and 
property is. performed by the lessee, the lessor has 
lost its status. as a carrier. But we think that con-
tention involves too narrow a construction of the 
word 'carrier'; for while the lessee does perform 
the actual work of transportation over the leased 
syste·m of railroads, the lessor still has important 
duties and functions to perform in connection with 
that transportation in which the public ·has. a vital 
and immediate interest and which are necessarily 
predicated upon and assume its continued status as 
a carrier. Under the terms of the lease it has. the 
right, and under the laws of the state it is charged 
with the duty, of requiring the lessee to maintain 
the leas.ed property in such a condition as may be 
necessary to enable it to render adequate and ef-
ficient service to the public, and also to require that 
the lessee during the continuance of the lease man-
age and operate the leased property in the same 
manner as. the lessor 'is now or shall and may at any 
time hereafter, be required by law to do.' * * * 
It was originally chartered as a carrier, it was organ-
ized as a carrier, until the lease referred to it oper-
ated a railroad system as a carrier, it is· still required 
to discharge many duties as a carrier, it is now 
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orga.ni.zed to net as a carrier, and in the event of 
default on the part of its lessee it must again active-
ly operate its railroad system as a carrier. Under 
those circunzstances, it remains no~o, as it originally 
was, a common carrier." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has likewise 
so held. North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zackary, 232 U. S. 248, 
58 L. Ed. 591, 34 S. Ct. 305. This case involved damages for 
the death of an employe and the question was whether or 
not the railroad company was subject to the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act as a common carrier in interstate 
commerce. In that case the Supreme Court of the United 
States pointed out that under North Carolina Law"* * * 
a railroad corporation cannot evade its public duty and 
responsibility by leasing its road to another corporation 
* * * ." Such holding is rather uniformly followed by 
most of the states, and we are certain that the provisions 
of Section 7 of Article XII of the Utah Constitution would 
require a similar holding with respect to the Short Line 
Company. 
In the Zachary case, the defendant North Carolina R. 
R. Co. was an intrastate railroad. However, all of its lines 
were leased and operated by the Southern Railway Company 
under a lease executed in 1909. The North Carolina courts 
held that the case was not within the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, and the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"It is not disputed that if the provisions of the 
Federal act had been applied, the result of the action 
might have been different." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The defendant had contended throughout "that at the 
time of the occurrence in question defendant, through its 
lessee, was a common carrier by railroad engaged in inter-
state commerce. * * * ." The U. S. Supreme Court held: 
"In order to bring the case within the terms of 
the Federal act (35 Stat. 65, c. 149, printed in full 
in 223 U. S., p. 6), defendant must have been, at 
the time of the occurrence in question, engaged as a 
common carrier in interstate commerce, and plain-
tiff's intestate must have been employed by said 
carrier in such commerce. If these facts appeared, 
the Federal act governed, to the exclusion of the 
statutes of the State. * * *" 
The Supreme Court referred to the fact that the North 
Carolina court had based its decision, among other reasons, 
upon the ground "that the corporation itself is not, although 
its lessee is, engaged in interstate commerce * * *."The 
United States Supreme Court held that the state court erred 
in holding that the Federal Employers' Liability Act had no 
application and reversed theN orth Carolina Supreme Court, 
stating: 
"* * * although a railroad lease as be-
tween the parties may have the force and effect of 
an ordinary lease, yet with respect to the railroad 
operations conducted under it, and everything that 
relates to the performance of the public duties as-
sumed by the lessor under its charter, such a lease-
certainly so far as concerns the rights of third par-
ties, including employees as well as patrons-con-
stitutes the lessee the lessor's substitute or agent, 
so that for whatever the lessee does or fails to do, 
whether in interstate or in intrastate commerce, the 
lessor is responsible. This being the legal situation 
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under the l~al law, it seems to us that it must and 
does result, in the case before us, that the lessor is a 
'common carrier by railroad engaging in commerce 
between the States.' * * *" 
\Ve confidently assert that under the foregoing author-
ities, including our constitutional provisions, there is no 
escape from the conclusion that the Oregon Short Line Rail-
road Company is at this date and at the present time a 
common carrier, although its duties and responsibilities as 
such common carrier and the transportation which makes it 
a common carrier are being carried on for it by its lessee as 
its "substitute or agent," pursuant to the contract of lease 
entered into January 1, 1936. 
A case which we think is interesting and enlightening 
upon this entire subject is the case of Lake Superior & 
Mississippi R. R. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442, 23 L. 
Ed. 965. An act of Congress in making a land grant for 
railroads provided that the United States. should have free 
use of the railroad as a public highway "free from all tolls 
or other charge for transportation of its property or troops." 
The question arose as to whether the word "railroad" in-
cluded rolling stock, so that no charge could be made for 
actual transportation, or whether the government could be 
charged for use of rolling stock if it did not have its own to 
move over the road. The railroad company transported goods 
and troops for the government and then went into the Court 
of Claims to ask for reasonable compensation therefor. The 
Court of Claims decided against the railroad company but the 
judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The Supreme Court gave a considerable recital of 
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the history of railroads and a. comparison of railroads with 
toll roads, turnpikes and canals. The court said: 
"It is undoubtedly familiar to most of those whose 
recollection goes back to that period, that railroads 
were generally expected to be general highways upon 
which every man who could procure the proper car-
riages and apparatuses would have the right to 
travel." 
It was stated that some early laws concerning railroads 
provided that the company should have power to prescribe 
the kind of carriage to be used on its road, by whom and 
whether to be propelled by steam or other power. With re-
spect to the act of Congress, the United States Supreme 
Court also said : 
,1, 
"All that the act reserves is the free use of the 
railroad. Of course, this implies also the free use of 
all fixtures and appurtenances forming part of the 
road and which are essential to its practical use, 
such as turn tables, swikhes, depots and other neees-
sary appendages * * * " 
"Equally untenable is the idea that, because rail-
roads are not ordinarily used as public highways, 
therefore the appellation of 'public highways' when 
given to them must mean something different from 
what it has ever meant before, and must embrace the 
rolling stock with which they are operated and used. 
Such a method of interpretation would set us all at 
sea, and would invest the courts with the power of 
making contracts, instead of the parties to them. 
* * * Where, as in the laws. under review the 
railroad is referred to throughout in its character as 
a road, as a permanent structure, and designated and 
required to be a 'public highway,' it cannot, without 
doing violence to the language, and disregarding the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
long established useage of legislative expression, as 
shown in the previous part of this opinion, be e~­
tended to embrace the rolling stock or other personal 
property of the railroad company." 
The decree of the Court of Claims was reversed and a 
new decree directed allowing compensation for the trans-
portation. 
United States v. Union Stockyards Co., 161 F. 919. The 
defendant Union Stockyards Company was charged, under 
the acts of Congress, with violation of the safety appliance 
acts because it transported over its railways. and roadbed a 
locomotive and engine with defective couplers. The defend-
ant contended that it was not a railroad and not a common 
carrier and therefore not subject to the safety appliance 
acts. The defendant owned about 35 miles of trackage and 
roadbed in and around the Omaha stockyards, connecting 
with various railroads and with livestock pens and packing 
houses. The defendant had a few locomotives of its own and 
operated them upon the tracks. It had 3 flatcars used for 
handling refuse and cinders over its own tracks. and 1 box-
car used as a tool storage car. "None of these cars. are 
(were) carried beyond the defendant's premises." The 
defendant handled with its locomotives cars of all kinds from 
all railroads into the slaughter pens and other yards, pack-
ing plants and hauled both loaded and empty cars out. 
"Over the 35 miles of track of the defendant is 
handled all the live stock consigned to commission 
agents and others who supply the 5 meat packing 
houses of South Omaha, one of the greatest centers 
of that industry in the United States * * *. The 
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live stock handled over defendant's road amounts to 
about 625 cars per day." 
With respect to freight rates and tariffs, the Federal 
Court stated : 
"* * * The ~efendant quotes no rates for 
the carriage of freight, whether live stock or dead 
freight, but collects all of the freight charges. on in-
coming live stock, when not prepaid, as an accom-
modation to the railroad companies, and it pays this 
amount over weekly to the railroad companies. The 
defendant collects no freight charges on outgoing 
live stock or dead freight. The charges of the defend-
ant to the railroad companies for service rendered 
the railroad companies are paid for by the railroad 
company requesting the service to be performe~. 
These charges are fixed and defini~e, under a con-
tract with the railroad companies. The charges for 
taking in empty cars. and taking out loaded cars are 
always the same, and these charges are not fixed 
with reference to the distance outgoing freight is to 
be carried or incoming freight has been carried, but 
are simply arbitrary charges fixed by the contract 
between the railroad companies and the defendant. 
Defendant does not join with any of the railroad 
companies in fixing the amount of charges for carry-
ing freight out of the yards to points outside of the 
yards, nor as to freight carried from outside of the 
defendant's yards, into its. yards, nor does the defend-
ant join with any railroad company in making any 
tariff charges for the carriage of freight at all, nor 
does it receive any portion of the money due from 
freight bills for carrying freight in or out of the 
defendant's yards. * * *. The charges made for 
handling the cars in the method above described are 
arbitrarily fixed at 50 cents, $1, and $2 per car. 
* * * 
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··The defendant contends that it is not subject to 
the (safety appliance) acts * * * that it is, not 
a common carrier and is not engaged in interstate 
commerce by railroad. * * * 
"A railroad has been defined as a road or way 
on which iron rails are laid for wheels to run on for 
the conveyance of heavy loads and vehicles * * * 
Such a track is a railroad independently of the use 
made of the track in the hauling of cars over it, as 
was pointed out in L. S. & M. R. Co. v. U. S., 93 U. 
S. 442, 23 L. Ed. 965. 
"In this case the road is not a mere switch main-
tained for the private purpose of the defendant, nor 
are cars delivered to the consignees when they are 
set upon the transfer track, and therefore an es-
sential part of the transportation of the cars and 
freight therein contained is unfinished.- * * *" 
"* * * The defendant, having chosen to de-
vote its railroad tracks to a public use, must be held 
to be a common carrier. * * *" 
Thus, in this , case the stockyards company was held to 
be both a railroad and a common carrier. 
We would like at this point also to refer the court and 
counsel to a fact which we think is common knowledge, and 
that is that the American Express Company is held to be 
a common carrier, although the trans.portation of express 
and merchandise for such express company is performed for 
it under contract by various railroads throughout the United 
States. 
We confidently assert that the plaintiff and respondent 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is a common carrier. 
However, we think that as far as the condemnation action 
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involved herein is concerned, the collateral question as to 
whether or not the respondent is a common carrier is im-
material and is nort properly an issue upon which it was 
necessary for the court to make any finding. It is true that 
the plaintiff alleged in its complaint for condemnation that 
it was a common carrier. That allegation, we think, was im-
material. The complaint also stated that plaintiff was a 
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of 
the laws of the State of Utah as a railroad corporation, and 
we think that the evidence is conclusive to prove such allega-
tion. 
In connection with this point of argument, we wish to 
refer to the Utah law with respect to eminent domain. Chap-
ter 61 of Title 104, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is the general 
statute with respect to eminent domain. The first section 
in that chapter sets forth the uses for which eminent domain 
may be prosecuted. We would like to call the court's atten-
tion to the fact that the power of eminent domain by said 
Chaper 61 is not given to any "common carrier." It is not 
given to any corporation, association, or individual as such, 
but that law states that "the right of eminent domain may 
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses," and then 
follows 14 subparagraphs setting forth various "public 
uses" for which eminent domain may be exercised, and in 
not one single instance is that right under said Chapter 
61 given to any individual or to any corporation or other 
entity in any respect. 
The statute says : The power "may be exercised in be-
half of the following public uses." Exercised by whom? By 
any one who can show a proper public use. IT IS THE 
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PROPER PUBLIC USE AND NOT T'HE INDIVIDUAL 
OR CORPORATION OR OTHER ENTITY SEEKING TO 
CONDEMN WHICH IS IMPORTANT UNDER THIS 
STATUTE. A public use for which eminent domain may be 
exercised under that statute, as specified, is: " ( 4) * * * 
railroads * * * for public transportation." That does 
not say that it is given to a railroad corporation (as Section 
77-0-5 does) , nor that it is given to a railroad company or 
any transportation company which may prove that it is a 
common carrier, but the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised for the use of or to provide "railroads * * * 
for public transportation." The industrial track which plain-
tiff is seeking to extend into the area involved in this action 
is a "railroad" to be used for "pu'blic transportation." There 
are numerous cases holding that such a spur or industrial 
track is a part of a ''railroad,'' and comes within the designa-
tion or definition of "railroad" under such a statute. There-
fore, the use sought by plaintiff and respondent in this action 
is a use authorized by said Chapter 61 and the question as 
to whether plaintiff is a common carrier is entirely beside 
the point and begs the issue. 
We call attention to the other subsections of section 1, 
Chapter 61. Even with counties and other municipal bodies, 
Chapter 61 does not give the right of eminent domain to the 
county or city, but the right of eminent domain may be ex-
ercised for "public buildings and grounds for the use of 
any county, city or incorporated town, etc." With mining 
companies, the right of eminent domain is not given to the 
mining ·companies as such, but under subsection 6 the right 
is given for roads, railroads, tram·ways, etc., to facilitate 
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the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores or the work-
ing of mines, etc. These references to our statute show the 
theory upon which the law of eminent domain rests, and as 
was said in the case of Denver R. L. & C. Co. v. Union Pacific 
R. R. Co., 34 F. 386: 
"It is the object to which the land is to be de-
voted and not the party claiming the right to take 
land, that is required to be public." 
Again, in the same case : 
"The inquiry is not as to what the company was 
organized for, or whether it will be a private or pub-
lic corporation, but what the road will be,-the struc-
ture its.elf,-if any such thing shall be_ made. * * * 
It may be a question of inquiry to be determined as 
matter of fact, whether the road, when built, will be 
a public or private road, and the question will be the 
same whether the road shall be built by a corporation 
or by an individual. That question does not in any 
way appertain to the other, by whom the road is 
built. It is a question what the road itself is, not as 
to the character, or the quality of the builder. 
* * * " 
Thus, again we say that while we do not agree with counsel 
in his charge that the respondent is not a common carrier, 
AND WE ASSERT· T'HAT IT IS A CO·MMON ;CARRIER, 
we nevertheless urge that under our eminent domain law 
the question of whether plaintiff and respondent is or is 
not a common carrier is immaterial. 
With respect to this action, different than may be true 
in cases involving mines, irrigation projects, logging roads 
or otherwise, we have a separate statute particularly ap-
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plying to railroads. That is why earlier in this brief we 
stated that railroads, by virtue of our constitution and 
laws in this state, are somewhat in a class by then1selves. 
Section 77-0-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides: 
"'Every railroad corporation org~anized under 
the la·ws of this state shall, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this title and subject to the limitations and 
requirements hereof, have all the rights, privileges 
and powers, and be subject to all the duties and 
obligations, of corporations organized for pecuniary 
profit, and in addition thereto such railroad corrpo~ 
ration shall have the following p~owers: 
* * * * * 
"(3) To enter by its servants upon the real 
property of any person for the purpose of selecting 
an advantageous route for its main line or any ex-
tension or branch thereof, or for the purpose of re-
locating the same, subject to responsibility for all 
damages resulting therefrom; and to condemn in 
the manner required by law a right of way * * * ." 
Thus, in addition to what is provided by the general law 
with respect to eminent domain, our statutes provide that 
every railroad corporation organized under the laws of this 
state shall have the power to condemn property for a right 
of way. 
It cannot be disputed that the Short Line is a "rail-
road corporation organized under the laws of this state". 
And, as is shown by Exhibit A, it was such a corporation 
certified to be in good standing by the Secretary of State 
of the State of Utah at approximately the date of com-
mencement of trial herein. As such, neither the co·rpora-
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tion itself nor any of such a corporation's usual and ordi-
nary rights and powers are subject to collateral attack in 
such a proceeding as this. 
The appellant has not shown, or attempted to show, 
in any way, why, under this provision of the statute, the 
plaintiff and respondent should not now be authorized to 
prosecute this condemnation action. The statute in plain 
terms gives it that porwer, regardless of any argument on 
behalf of counsel with respect to officers, agents, conduc-
tors, etc., or whether or not it is a common carrier. It 
cannot be disputed that the property owned and held by it 
is being used for railroad purposes and for purposes of 
performing the duties of a common carrier ~and is so being 
used under contract by the lessee as "substitute or agent" 
for and on behalf of the lessor. We call attention to the 
provisions of paragraph 8 of the lease which provides that 
the contract may be terminated on short notice. The lessor, 
under the laws already quoted, cannot relieve itself of the 
duties and obligations which are imposed upon it under its 
franchise as a corporation, and in addition to those duties 
and the possibility that the lease can be and may have to 
be cancelled on short notice, whereby the respondent would 
resume full oper,ation, there are other provisions in the 
lease which require certain duties· to be performed. currently, 
either upon request of the lessee or otherwise, in connec-
tion with transfers of property, adjusting ac-counts, and 
reimbursing lessee for costs of additions and betterments, 
even to the extent of issuing new bonds. or other evidences 
of indebtedness if that should be necessary. (See paragraph 
7 of the lease as quoted hereinabove.) 
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Counsel for appellant quotes and seems to place con-
siderable reliance in his brief upon the case of In re N iaga,ra 
Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429, 
and on page 8 of his brief states : 
"The court of appeals of New York has held 
that a railroad corporation must be a common car-
rier * * * '' 
That statement is not true. The question as to whether or 
not the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co. was. a common 
carrier was not even ·raised or discussed in that case, and 
the words "common carrier" were not even used therein. 
The question as to whether or not such railroad was a com-
mon carrier was not the basis of a decision in that ease, 
but the basis of opinion of the New York Court of Appeals 
was that the use proposed by the Niagara Falls & Whirl-
pool Ry. Co. was not a public use and therefore the railway 
company was not entitled to condemnation. The New York 
court did state that if the use is not a public use the ques-
tion as to whether or not the railway company has assumed 
in its articles of association the character of an ordinary 
railway association is immaterial, but the question of the 
nature of the railway corporation was not the issue in-
volved in that case but the issue was as to whether or not 
the use sought was a public use, and we wager that if the 
Niagara Falls & WhirlP'ool Ry. Co. had been seeking to 
build an ordinary railroad to transport freight traffic, or, 
having some such railroad, if it had sought to build a spur 
track or industrial lead as is involved here, we are sure 
that the New York court of appeals would have held the 
use to be a public use and the decision would have: been 
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different than it was in that case. The question of whether 
the use was public was not precluded by the fact that the 
plaintiff was a railroad corporation. The same is true 
here. The mere fact that the plaintiff is a railroad cor-
poration, even under Section 77-0-5 ( 3), would not be suf-
ficient to authorize plaintiff and respondent to condemn 
if the use herein sought was not a public use because even 
that fact only gives such a railroad corporation authority 
to condemn "in the manner provided by law," and the law 
relating to condemnation provides that the use must be 
such as is considered to be a public use. It is interesting 
to note that, while appellant quoted rather extensively from 
the Niag·ara case, after italicising a portion, appellant left 
out some of the text in his quote toward the bottom of page 
10 of his brief, and the portion left out by appellant reads 
as follows: 
"What is a public use is incapable of exact def-
inition. The expressions 'public interest' and 'public 
use' are not synonymous .. " 
The court then goes on to state : 
"* * * The ground upon which private 
property may be taken for railroad uses, without 
the ·consent of the owner, is primarily that railroads 
are highways furnishing means of communication 
between different points, promoting traffic and com-
merce, facilitating exchanges; in a word, they are 
improved ways. In every form of government the 
duty of providing public ways is acknowledged to be 
a public duty. In this state the duty of laying out 
and maintaining highways has, in the main, been 
performed dir·ectly by the state or by local authori-
ties; but, from an early day, the legislature has, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
from time to time, delegated to turnpike corpora-
tions the right and duty to maintain public roads 
in localities, and canal companies have been organ-
ized with powers of eminent domain. It would be 
impracticable, and contrary to our usages, for the 
state to enter upon the business of constructing and 
operating railroads, and, in analogy to the delega-
tion of the power of eminent domain to turnpike and 
canal companies, it wisely delegates to corporate 
bodies the right to construct and maintain railroads 
as public ways for the transportation of freight and 
passengers, and, as incident thereto, the right to 
take private property under the power of eminent 
domain on making compensation. * * *" 
Thus, the issue in the Niagara case was not as to the nature 
of the corporation itself because appellee, the Niagara 
company, in its organization had qualified in that respect, 
but the question was whether or not the use was a public 
use. And the court in that case concluded that: 
"The fact that the road of the petitioner may 
enable the portion of the public who visit Niagara 
falls more easily or more fully to gratify their cur-
iosity, or that the road will be public in the sense 
that all who desire will be entitled to be carried upon 
it, is not sufficient, we think, in view of the other 
necessary limitations, to make the enterprise a pub-
lic one, so as to justify condemnation proceedings. 
* * *" 
On page 11 counsel for appellant quotes from E'lliott 
on Railroads, Third Edition, Section 1204, and we admit 
the statement there quoted as good law, but appellant does 
not say and does not point out in the case at bar wherein 
it might claim that the particular scheme in which plaintiff 
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and respondent is here engaged is not a railroad enterprise 
or that the taking is not for a public purpose but in the 
final analysis appellant's argument is only that the plain-
tiff is not authorized to do the taking and, yet, he cites no 
law to support such a proposition. Immediately preceding 
the quotation which appellant takes from Section 1204 of 
Elliott on Railroads, Third Edition, and the beginning of 
Section 1204 reads : 
"A railroad company which is charged with the 
performance of the duties of a common carrier is, 
as we have seen, so far a public enterprise that it 
may be empowered to condemn the grounds needed 
for the construction and maintenance of its line." 
We have already referred to the fact that the respondent 
herein is, not only by law but by our state constitution, 
charged with the performance of these public duties and 
cannot evade them by lease or otherwise, and, of course, 
there was no intent to evade them by the lease. 
II. 
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTES AND CASES 
THE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUBLIC PUR-
POSE. 
We are surprised at appellant's counsel in setting forth 
such a heading for argument or in attempting to argue on 
such a point. We have already referred to the eminent 
domain statute and agree that it is the use that is impor-
tant and that use must be a public use. We wish to point 
out to the court that in the findings of fact, by finding No. 
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22 ( R. 54, 55) , the trial court found that "the use to which 
plaintiff intends to put said property hereby sought to be 
condemned is a public use authorized to plaintiff by law 
and the right sought hereby is necessary to such use''. By 
its conclusions of law, conclusion No. 3 (R. 56), the trial 
court concluded: "That the use to which plaintiff proposes 
to apply the property and right of way sought herein is a 
public use and is authorized by law." The appellant has 
not, either in its "Statement of Points Upon Which Appel-
lant Will Rely," as served immediately subsequent to the 
Notice of Appeal, nor anywhere in its brief or argument, 
attacked such finding and ·conclusion of the court, nor in 
any way attempted to point out wherein such a finding or 
conclusion would not be substantiated by the evidence, if 
it is plaintiff's claim that it was not so substantiated. In· its 
"Designation of P·ortions of the Record, Proceedings and 
Evidence to be Contained in Record on Appeal," the appel-
lant did not request that there be included in the record 
and ·certified to this court any of the evidence given by 
public witnesses owning property in the area involved who 
testified that they needed the trackage, wanted the track-
age, and had requested that the trackage be extended into 
the area for their benefit and that the trackage when ex-
tended would be contiguous to and serve their properties. 
For this reason the appellant has not properly ·certified 
to nor brought to this court the question as to whether or 
not the use proposed by plaintiff and respondent was or 
was not a public use and has in no manner attacked the 
court's findings or conclusions or the evidence upon such 
subject. 
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In its. Statement of Points (R. 72, 73), and as repeated 
on pages 3 and 4 of its brief, the appellant contended that 
plaintiff and respondent was not a common carrier, that 
the district court should have found that it was not en-
gaged in the rendering of public service, and that the dis-
trict court should have concluded, therefore, that plaintiff 
and respondent was not entitled to condemn and that there-
fore the judgment is against law because respondent is 
not engaged in the rendition of any public s·ervice. THERE 
IS NO Q:UES:TION WHATSO·EVER RAISED AS TO 
WHET'HER OR NOT THE USE PROPOSED BY PLAIN-
TIFF WAS F'OR A PUBLIC PURPOSE, OR WHETHER 
SUCH PROPOSED USE WAS OR WAS NOT A PUBLIC 
USE. 
We do not wish to waive our right to object to this 
failure on the part of appellant to properly present such 
question to this court on appeal, but we cannot see the 
materiality nor the reason for the citing and quoting from 
the cases referred to by counsel on pages 11 to 17, inclusive, 
of his brief. We do not wish to allow the matter to go un-
challenged for that reason, and we will therefore make 
brief reference to some of the cases. which may bear upon 
such subject. We feel that we do not need to go to any 
jurisdiction outside the State of Utah because this court 
has on numerous occasions gone into considerable detail 
as. to what may or may not be considered as. a public use 
within our Utah statutes. Counsel cites. and quotes, on 
page 12. of his brief, from the cases, Cereghino v. O~egon 
Short LineR. Co., 26 Utah 467, 73 P. 634, and Stockdale v. 
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849. 
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Neither of such cases was a condemnation case but they 
arose on injunction proceedings in such a way that they 
can be directly applied. The· Cereghino case was first in 
time, and in that case the Short Line sought to extend a 
track to serve the Con. Wagon & Machine Company. It was 
admitted that only the one industry could or would be 
served, and therefore the court held that the spur track 
was for the convenience and accommodation of a private 
business. The Rio Grande learned a lesson from the Cere-
ghino case, and in the Stockdale case, while the evidence 
seemed to point rather conclusively to the fact that the 
only industry that was available or could be served by the 
Rio Grande spur was the brewing company, nevertheless 
the Rio Grande produced testimony that it would serve 
anyone who applied and the spur would be available to 
all and, thus, being open to the public generally, the court 
held that it was a public use and, as quoted by counsel, 
the court stated that if all persons and business institutions 
which may have occasion to do so, be permitted to use it 
and the track will be open to the public use generally, "if 
so then it is a public utility". Again we state that the 
evidence in this case did show much more strongly than 
was shown in the Stockdale case that it will be open to the 
use by the public generally. Nevertheless, counsel for appe~­
lant did· not see fit to certify to this court the evidence that 
would so show. There were a number of witnesses who 
appeared and testified that they had requested that this 
trackage be extended into this area to serve their proper-
ties, and the evidence was that it would serve all property 
owners in the area or all who sought service from it. There ·. 
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were other witnesses in addition to the same witnesses who 
appeared before the Public Service Commission of Utah 
in 'Case No. 7597, entitled, D'enver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad c·ompany v. Public· Service Commission of Utah 
and Union Pacific Railroad Company, 230 P. 2d 5S7, where-
in this court held that the Public Service ·Commission had 
rightly found that public convenience and necessity existed 
sufficient to warrant the action taken by the Commission 
in that case. W·e wonder if appellant by inference does 
intend to argue that the trial court erred in its finding and 
conclusion that the use involved herein was a public use. 
If so, why did not counsel attack the finding and the con-
clusion and refer to the evidence if the evidence did not 
support such finding and conclusion, and why did he not 
designate and request all evidence· be certified to this court 
if he· intended to argue on such a point? 
If counsel intends to base his argument solely on the 
lack of power or authority in plaintiff to prosecute con-
demnation actions, we have no quarrel with him as far as 
the record he has brought to this, court is concerned, but 
on that question we think the· issue is not what the articles 
of incorporation may show and not whether or not the 
plaintiff and respondent is a common carrier, but does 
plaintiff and respondent have the right to ·condemn. We 
insist that the plaintiff is a railroad corporation under the 
act contained in Title 77 of our statutes and that, beyond 
that, the defendant and appellant cannot launch any col-
lateral attack upon the rights. of the plaintiff corporation 
as such and the sole question then would be whether or 
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not the plaintiff, having leased its properties, can never-
theless still prosecute an action in condemnation. 
In the case of Apex Tra.nsportation Co. v. Garbade, 
32 Ore. 582, 52 P. 573, cited by counsel on page 16 of his 
brief, there is the statement that no declaration of the 
objects and purposes of a company in its charter can aid 
it in a condemnation case. We again call attention to the 
fact that in such case the only question involved was 
whether the use proposed was a public use, and we admit, 
and will reiterate, as was true in the case of Niagar'a. Falls 
Whirlpool Ry. Co., if the use proposed is not a public· us:e, 
nothing contained in the articles or charter of a company 
can aid the corporation in taking the property sought. But 
the question thus involved is the question of public use 
and not the question as to the authority or power of the 
corporation, and if the use proposed is a public use author-
ized by law and if the corporation is one having right by 
law to prosecute condemnation, then the Niagarra, case and 
Apex Tra.nsporta.tion case and others cited by counsel can 
have no application. 
In the Apex Transport·ation Co. v. Garbade case, the 
company was organized to construct a skid road but the 
court found that the principal portion of its road had not 
even been surveyed or definitely located and that over the 
portion in question "when constructed the only practical 
use to which it can be put will be the transportation of logs 
for this mill company, and for no other, * * * ." Thus, 
the question at issue there was a question as to whether 
or not the use proposed was a public use and not whether 
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the transportation company was entitled to condemn other-
wise. 
In Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 P. 
681, a logging road was held not to be a public use on the 
basis that the law providing that such logging road would 
be a public use was unconstitutional under a constitutional 
provision which stated : 
"Whenever an attempt is made to take private 
property for a use alleged to be public, the question 
whether the contemplated use be really public shall 
be a judicial question, and determined as such with-
out regard to any legislative assertion that the use 
is public." 
The court in that case found: 
"An examination of all the different constitu-
tions in the union shows that only two other states, 
viz., Colorado and Missouri, have the provision of 
our constitution * * * ." 
Again we say, however, that the holding of the court was 
that the use was not a public use. 
In the case of Ama.dor·Queen Mining· Co. v. DeWitt, 73 
Cal. 482., 15 P. 7 4, the plaintiff tried to condemn a right of 
way through defendant's tunnel and was denied that right 
by the California court. We do not believe that such a hold-
ing would be followed by the California court today. Never-
theless, regardless of that fact, such case is exactly con-
trary to the case of Montaire Mining Co. v. Columbus 
Rex·all Consolidated Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172, 
wherein the plaintiff sought and was granted the right of 
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condemnation to use jointly \vith defendant a tunnel owned 
by defendant. In that case this court stated: 
"We think it is generally agreed that where the 
right of eminent domain is granted for a particular 
purpose, then the statute must be given a libe·ral 
construction in furtherance of such purpose." 
The case of Hercules TT"ater Co. v. Fernandez, 5 ·Cal. 
App. 726, 91 P. 401, involved again a question as to 'vhether 
the use was a public use, and the condemnor in that case 
did not comply with the statute but tried to broaden the 
purposes as stated in the statute. 
Sutter v. Nicols, 152 ·Cal. 688, 9-3 P. 872, was not a 
condemnation case but a case where one operating a mine 
was enjoined from dumping tailings and refuse in a stream, 
causing the stream to overflow on plaintiff's land. 
The case of Stratford Irrigation District v. Empire 
Water Co., 111 P. 2d 957, 44 Cal. App. 61, takes a more 
liberal view than earlier cases, and that case states, simi-
lar to what we have hereinabove quoted from the Montaire 
Mining case, as follows: 
"It has been held that where the legislature de-
clares a particular use to be a public use the presump-
tion is in favor of its declaration and the courts will 
not interfere therewith unless the use is clearly and 
manifestly of a private character." 
We wish to refer again to the fact that the question 
as to whether or not the use proposed by plaintiff and 
respondent is a public use is not before this court and the 
cases cited by counsel have been cited apparently to sup-
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port the proposition that a proposed use cannot be aided 
by any declaration of the objects and purposes stated in 
the ·charter of the company or by any legislative act. We 
did and do agree with that statement, and we are not try-
ing, and did not try in the trial court, to prove that the 
use proposed by plaintiff and respondent was a public use 
by reference to plaintiff's articles of incorporation or any-
thing of a similar nature. The court found and concluded 
that the use proposed by plaintiff was a public use and 
such finding is not assailed, and the only point that ap-
pellant has raised or can raise in connection therewith is 
appellant's argument that plaintiff, having leased its line, 
is not entitled to file condemnation. 
With respect to the question of public use, however, 
we do wish to refer briefly to the following cases, in addi-
tion to the Stockdale and Cereghino cases cited by counsel. 
Nash v. Clwrk, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371. This was a suit 
by one man to condemn a right of way to enlarge and use 
an irrigation ditch, and the sole question was whether this 
was a public use. The holding of this court is enlightening 
with respect thereto: 
"There is no fixed rule of law by which this 
question can be determined. In other words, what 
is a public use cannot always be determined by the 
application of purely legal principles. This is evi-
dent from the fact that there are two lines of au-
thorities, neither of which attempts to lay down any 
fixed rules as a guide to be followed in all cases. 
One class of authorities in a general way, holds 
that by public use is meant a use by the public or 
its agencies-that is, the public must have the right 
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to the actual use in some way of the property ap-
propriated; whereas, the other line of decisions 
holds that it is a public use within the meaning of 
the law when the taking is for a use that will pro-
mote the public interest and which use tends to de-
velop the great natural resources of the common-
wealth. After a careful examination of the leading 
cases on this subject we are of the opinion that the 
class of decisions last mentioned are more in har-
mony with enlightened public policy, and the liberal 
interpretation given the term 'public use' which the 
legislature has, in effect, declared shall be followed 
in this state, is far more conducive to individual and 
public advancement than the restricted construction 
adopted and followed by the line of decisions first 
referred to." 
This case was affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Ncwh v. Clark, 19'8 U. S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 25 
S. Ct. 676. See, also, Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 
200 U. S. 527, 50 L. Ed. 581, 26 S. Ct. 301, wherein the 
Strickley case referred to by appellant was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. See, also, Town 
of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. 2'd 343; Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 2'3 Utah 474, 65 P. 735. 
Butte A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Montana U. Ry. Co. (Mont.), 
41 P. 232. Plaintiff railroad sought to condemn portions 
of defendant's right of way not actually possessed and used 
by defendant to provide an extension for plaintiff's road 
and for spurs to mines in the Butte area. There were 
several crossings of the defendant road involved. We quote 
from the opinion of the Montana Supreme Court: 
"It is well established that if, in point of law, 
a use is public, the fact that not many persons will 
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enjoy the use is not material * * *. The char-
acter of a way, whether it is public or private, is 
determined by the extent of the right to use it and 
not by the extent to which that right is exercised. 
If all the people have the right to use it, it is a 
public way, although the number who have occasion 
to exercise the right is very small * * *. The 
·circumstance that the plaintiff road was built by a 
private corporation and that its bra~ches are not 
within convenient contiguity of private mines or 
ore houses, does not materially affect the road and 
give a private character to its use or to the use of 
its spurs. All termini of tracks and switches are 
more or less beneficial to private parties, but the 
public character of the use of the tracks is never 
affected by this. 'It may be in such cases that it is 
expected, or even that it is intended, that such tracks 
will be used almost entirely by the manufacturer; 
yet if there is no exclusion of an equal right of use 
by others and the singleness of use is simply there-
sult of location and convenience of access, it can-
not affect the question' · * * * ." 
See, also, CottreU v. Chicago T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co. 
(Ind.), 13.S N. E. 504; Westp·ort Stone Co. v. Thomas (Ind.), 
94 N. E. 406; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Cherry Tree & Dixon'IJille 
R. Co. (Pa.), 116 A. 45; Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. 
Ammons (Tex.), 215 S. W. 2d 407. These cases are in 
accord with the Stockdale: case and other Utah cases here-
inabove cited. 
III. 
A RAILROAD COMPANY CANNOT CONDEMN 
LAND FOR USES ·NOT CONNECTED WITH 
THE CONDUCT' OF ITS BUSINESS OR RE-
MOTE FROM PROPERTIES OWNED BY IT. 
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Under this heading appellant has cited one or two 
cases but has not attempted to point out how any of the 
authorities apply to the case at bar. We admit that the 
Short Line could not condemn property for a right of wa:y 
which was not connected with its tracks nor with the busi-
ness transacted over its tracks by its lessee, the Union 
Pacific. It is the Short Line that owns the tracks and the 
property with which the industry track connection in ques-
tion will be made, and it is the Short Line's business being 
conducted by its lessee that would be affected by the track 
in question. 
See McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pacific R·. Co. 
(Colo), 158 F. 5. The city of Denver granted a franchise 
or license to the Union Pacific to construct a s.pur track 
along Blake Street in Denver to a proposed area where in-
dustries and warehouses were to be built but were not 
yet located in the area. The franchise along Blake Street 
ran from 19th to 27th Streets. Plaintiffs were owners of 
property fronting on the street and sought to enjoin the 
construction of the railroad spur on the basis that it was 
purely a private enterprise and not a public use. We quote 
from the opinion: 
"This railroad company had an established line 
of railroad through the city of Denver and the tTacks 
upon Blake Street authorized by the ordinance were 
spur tracks from its main track for the benefit of 
parties who expected to build warehouses on vacant 
property abutting on that street * * *" 
"The suggestion that the license was. unauthor-
ized because the tracks were not for public but for 
private use· cannot prevail. In a sense every spur to 
' 
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a private warehouse, manufacturing or trading es-
tablishment, is for private us-e of those who own and 
conduct the business therein but in a larger sense 
and in the true sense every such railroad track is 
for the public use and for the public benefit, because 
it enables the public to exchange its commodities for 
those of the parties who conduct their business upon 
the track in a more facile and economical way. It re-
duces the price of the articles. carried to the con-
sumer and it increases commerce." 
It will be noted that the federal court in this Colorado 
case referred to the fact that the Union Pacific "had an 
established line of railroad through the city of Denver'' and 
that the proposed tracks "were spur tracks from its main 
track." The Union Pacific does not own the railroad in 
question here. The Short Line owns the main line track 
from which the proposed spur would extend and owns the 
properties involved from McCammon, Idaho, on the north 
to Sandy, Utah, south of Salt Lake. The Union Pacific 
owns a line of railroad in its own right and not as lessee, 
extending east from Ogden, Utah, but only operates the 
properties in question here for the Short Line under lease. 
We are definitely certain that if a condemnation action 
had been filed in the name of the Union Pacific, wherein 
the Union Pacific itself had sought to condemn a right of 
way for trackage anywhere in the Salt Lake area, the de-
fendant would have immediately protested that "a railroad 
company cannot condemn land for uses not connected with 
the conduct of its business as a common carrier," and that 
the Union Pacific had no railroad in the Salt Lake area and 
was not entitled in any manner to condemn property for 
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railroad purposes in the Salt Lake City area. It would be 
the same as if either the Union Pacific or the Short Line 
had attempted to condemn land somewhere in Carbon 
County, Utah. Neither has any railroad properties or con-
ducts railroad business there, and neither would have the 
right to condemnation of property any,vhere in Carbon 
County, even though they may attempt to allege that such 
condemnation was for railroad purposes or other public 
uses. 
In the case at bar, however, the properties are prop-
erties of the Short Line and are operated for the Short 
Line by the Union Pacific by virtue of the lease, and au-
thorities which state that a railroad company cannot con-
demn land for uses not connected with the conduct of its 
business are not in point. The cases cited on pages 18 and 
19 of counsel's brief refer to property needed for construc-
tion of dwellings for employes and property desired for 
a park. These cases clearly cannot be in point and appellant 
has not cited any case that would be in point upon its ar-
gument with respect to common carrier, ·or otherwise. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT BY LEASING 
ITS PROPERTIES TO THE UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD COMPANY DID NOT LOSE ITS 
RIGHT TO CONDEMN, AND PLAINTIFF AND 
RESPONDENT DOES HAVE POWER AND 
AUTHORITY TO BRING AND PROSECUTE 
THIS CONDEMNATION ACTION. 
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As we have heretofore set forth, this point No. IV is 
one posed by respondent and not by appellant but, in our 
opinion, is the real point at issue and the issue upon which 
appellant's counsel performed the major burden of his 
labors as far as the trial court is concerned. Throughout 
the trial of this. case counsel for appellant has insisted and 
repeated that plaintiff and respondent is not a common 
carrier, it is not a railroad company, it does not perform 
the duties of a railroad, it has disposed of all its property 
by lease and therefore is not entitled to condemnation. The 
major portion of what counsel has otherwise argued in 
appellant's brief tends only to cloud the issues. We have 
already stated and quoted authority herein to show that 
the plaintiff and respondent is a common carrier; that the 
railroad transportation being performed by Union Pacific 
is being performed by that company for and. on behalf of 
the lessor, ·the Short Line. 
We have heretofore quoted provisions of Section 77-0-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 19'43, which sets forth that, in addi-
tion to rights, privileges and powers held. by ordinary cor-
porations "such railroad corporations shall have the follow-
ing powers," and then sets forth 14 separate subparagraphs 
of additional powers. We have quoted the provisions of 
Section 77-0-5·(3), which give the right and power to a 
railroad corporation, under the laws of Utah, to condemn 
property for a right of way. Subparagraph (9) of that same 
Section 77-0-5 provides that .such a "railroad corporation 
organized under the laws of this state" shall also have the 
right and power 
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"to lease, sell, convey and transfer its property and 
franchises or any part thereof to any railroad cor-
poration not owning any competitive line in this 
state * * * ." 
If a railroad corporation such as is referred to in that 
section ceases to be such a railroad corporation with the 
powers therein enumerated when it leases its property, as is 
the contention of appellant, THEN SUCH A RAILROAD 
CORPORATION DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER T'O 
LEASE AND THE STATUTE THUS GIVING IT THAT 
RIGHT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AND AN ABSO-
LUTE NULLIT·Y. If a railroad corporation organized 
under the laws of the State of Utah is by the same law and 
the same section given the right to prosecute actions in 
condemnation and also given the right to lease its properties, 
then it cannot be argued that if such a corporation does lease 
its properties it is no longer a railroad corporation entitled 
to condemnation. We think that this statute in and of itself 
is a complete and entirely sufficient answer to the contention 
of appellant herein. Nevertheless, the authorities are quite 
numerous which go to support the position taken by plain-
tiff and respondent and which are, without dispute or dis-
sent, opposed to and directly contrary to the position taken 
by the defendant and appellant herein. 
Elliott on Railroads, Third Edition, Volume 2, Section 
1202, page 706. Right to Condemnation where road is 
leased: 
"Right to condemn where road is leased or in 
hands of a receiver.-It is said that personal rights 
and privileges granted to a corporation can only be 
exercised by its board of directors or other govern-
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ing body. The power of eminent domain is granted as 
a personal trust, and can not be delegated or trans-
ferred without legislative sanction; accordingly, it 
is held that neither the purchasers, nor the lessees, 
of a railroad can exercise the right without express 
authority. And, where its road can not be succe·ss-
fully operated without the acquisition of the prop-
erty sought to be ·condemned, a company which has 
leased all its. property and franchises may exercise 
the right of eminent domain, even though the lease 
is for the entre life of the corporation and the prop-
erty is taken solely for the use of the lessee. It has 
been held that a railroad company, leasing the prop-
erty and franchises of another, the corporate identity 
of the lessor being maintained, may exercise the pow-
er of the lessor to widen its roadbed, though the ex-
ercise of the power is practically for the benefit of 
the lessee. * * *" 
In re New York L. & W. R. Co. v. Union Steamboat Co·., 
1 N. E. 27. The plaintiff sought to condemn land for rail-
road purposes. However, the plaintiff did not operate its 
road but the road was operated under a lease by another 
company. We quote from the opinion: 
"It is further objected that the petitioner has 
lost its right to condemn lands by reason of its lease 
for the full period of its corporate life to the Dela-
ware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, a 
corporation organized under the laws of Pennsyl-
vania. We do not understand that the validity of this 
lease, as between the contracting parties, is serious-
ly questioned. * * * It must be treated as valid 
for the purpose of the objection, since, if invalid, the 
question raised practically disappears. The ground 
insisted upon is that the lessor company, having 
parted with the entire control of its road for the full 
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period of its existence, cannot longer be said to re-
quire any additional lands for its purposes, but such 
land could only be required for the purposes. of the 
lessee. ''r e are to observe precisely what the question 
is. If it is a legal possibility that the lessor company 
could need or require the property for its corporate 
uses, the question of fact whether in truth it did so 
need it was litigated and decided on the evidence 
favorably to the petitioner, and with sufficient rea-
son. But the contention here is, as matter of law, 
that such necessity could not by possibility survive 
the lease. Upon that point we think the case of Kip 
v. New York & H. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 227, should con-
trol our conclusion. There the lessor company had 
instituted proceedings for the condemnation of land. 
During the pendency of such proceedings it leased 
its road to another company, and all its rights, fran-
chises, and privileges, for the term of 401 years. 
Thereafter the land-owner brought an action to re-
strain the further prosecution of the condemnation 
proceedings, upon the precise ground taken here, 
that, because of the lease, the lessor company could 
not possibly need or require under the law the prop-
erty sought. 
"The decision was adverse to that contention. 
The court said that the same necessity existed after 
as before the lease, 'and it is legally appropriate to 
affirm that it exists in favor of the defendant, not-
withstanding the lease.' The appellant's criticism 
upon that case is that both parties were domestic 
corporations, and here one is not. That is immaterial 
to the inquiry. If the lease here is valid, the debated 
question is the same; and whether the lessee company 
is a foreign corporation or not is of no consequence, 
for such lessee is not here seeking to condemn lands 
for itself. If the lease is void, then the lessor com-
pany stands like any other domestic railroad com-
pany seeking to acquire lands for its own purposes. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
If any justification of the case cited is needed, it may 
be found in the fact that section 21 of the railroad act, 
as amended many times., evidently contemplates the 
acquisition of lands by companies which have leased 
their roads, and in the further consideration that, 
by its lease, the lessor company in no· respect escapes 
from or lessens its corporate duty to the state, but is 
continuilng the performance of that duty through the 
agency of its lessee, and may at any time, through 
the failure of the latter to perform its covenant ob-
ligations., or by its absolute loss. of corporate life and 
existence, become repossessed of its line and prop-
erty, and bound to operate it for itself; and that, to 
the proper performance of its duty by itself, or 
through its lessee, the acquisition of lands or terminal 
facilities. may be necessary and essential." 
Dietricks v. L. & N. W. R. Co. (Neb.), 13 N. W. 624. 
Defendant filed condemnation proceedings. to secure prop-
erty for depot and yard purposes in the city of Columbus, 
Nebraska. The plaintiff then filed this case, seeking an in-
junction against defendant to block the condemnation pro-
ceedings. It was shown that the defendant's. lines and prop-
erty were all leas.ed to the Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co., and it 
was contended that, therefore, the L. & N. W. Co. had no 
right to condemn. Incidentally, in that case it was argued 
that proper officers of that company had not authorized the 
proceedings. The trial court denied the injunction and the 
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. We quote from the 
opinion: 
"It is also urged that certain testimony given by 
the witness Post as. to what was done and said by E. 
A. Touzalin, the general manager of the company, in 
directing the location of the tracks and depot grounds, 
and as to the necessity of taking this lot, ought to 
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have been excluded. Much of this testin1ony was ad-
mitted without objection: but even that which was 
not, was clearly admissible under the pleadings, 
especially in view of the charge made in the petition 
that the proceedings in condemnation were not di.-
rected by any competent authority, but by persons 
whose only relations to the company was merely that 
of attorneys at law. * * *. We are of opinion 
that, in the location of depot and other grounds of a 
railroad company, and in fixing their extent, the de-
cision of the general manager of the company, who, 
as this official designation fairly implies, and the 
evidence clearly shows, 'had charge of all its busi-
ness,' including the construction of its road and 
buildings, is prima facie, and, in the absence of all 
evidence to the contrary, a just measure of what is 
essential to the convenient and proper conduct of its 
business, and sufficient to warrant the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain in its behalf. * * *" 
* * * * * 
"It appears that the defendant company, prior 
to the commencement of the proceedings to condemn 
this lot, had, by lease for a term of years, transferred 
to another company 'all of the property and fran-
chises' which it then owned or might thereafter 
acquire. This lease, it is urged, had the effect to de-
prive the defendant of the right, even if it would 
otherwise have had it, to exercise the power of 
eminent domain, and that therefore the finding of 
the referee in this respect was erroneous. We think 
this objection is untenable. The leas.e expressly pro-
vides that the defendant shall 'do and perform any 
and every corporate act which may be necessary, use-
ful, or appropriate to secure to' its lessee 'the full en-
joyment of * * * every franchise, right, ease-
ment, power, and privilege' which it then possessed 
or might thereafter acquire; and that it would also, 
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to this end, maintain its corporate organization. The 
condemnation of this lot for the purpose of the com-
pany is certainly a corporate act, and, if essential to 
the convenient and proper use of its road by the 
lessee, is one which, by the terms of the lease, the de-
fendant was bound to perform upon request. And, 
besides, there is no authority for proceeding in any 
other name than that of the defendant company." 
Lower v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. (Iowa), 13 N. W. 
718. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. was seeking 
property to double track its line through a portion of Iowa. A 
question was raised as to its power to condemn, inasmuch 
as it was, a foreign corporation and not an Iowa corpora-
tion. It caused to be formed under the laws of Iowa the 
Chillicothe & Sheriton R. R. Co., which then brought the 
condemnation. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against 
both railroads. It appeared that the new Iowa corporation 
adopted a survey already made by the Chi. B. & Q., and it 
was shown that the new company had leased the new road 
in question to the Chi. B. & Q., and the Burlington was doing 
the actual construction of the road. The trial court dis-
missed the petition, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment. We quote from the opinion: 
"A corporation has all the power expressed in 
its articles of incorporation or charter, and all other 
powers reasonably incident to the exercise of the 
expressed powers, unless restricted by some statute 
or rule of law. * * * 
"* * * If, then, the Chicago B. & Q. R. R. 
Co. lacks the power to build such road * * * the 
Chillicothe & Sheriton R. R. Co. can build the road 
and that, too, even though it derives all its. means 
from the Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. and builds it 
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with the express design of leasing it to that com-
pany.'' 
State v. Superior Court (Wash.), 72 P. 89. The Seattle 
& Montana Railroad Company was a railroad corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Washington. It 
sought to condemn lands "for the purpose of tracks and a 
cite for terminal buildings and facilities." This Seattle 
company did not actually operate its properties but they were 
operated under lease by the Great Northern Railway Com-
pany. The public service commission authorized condemna-
tion, and the owners of the land involved brought the matter 
to the Supreme Court by certiorari. The Washington 
Supreme Court stated : 
"* * * we think the petitioner also satis-
factorily proved that the premises were required 
and necessary for the purposes specified, namely, a 
right of way for its tracks and a site for a passenger 
station and for platforms, warehouses, etc. But it 
was shown by the testimony of the petitioner's 
engineer that the petitioner is not the owner of 
any locomotives or cars, and that it does not operate 
its railroad, but the same is operated by the Great 
Northern Railway Company, under some kind of 
an agreement between them, the terms of which 
were not disclosed by the evidence. * * * '' 
In spite of the objection of the property owners, the trial 
court found that the contemplated use was a public use and 
that the Seattle company was entitled to proceed with the 
condemnation. In confirming the trial court, the Washing-
on Supreme Court said: 
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"It is also objected that the respondent the 
Seattle & Montana Railroad Company has no right 
to condemn this property for the purposes indicated 
in its petition, because it appears from the evidence 
that it has no rolling stock of its own, does not 
operate its road, and does and will permit the Great 
Northern Railway Company and other railroad 
companies to run their passenger and freight trains 
over its line into Seattle, and to use its depot and 
terminal grounds there situated. In other words, it 
seems to be claimed that the proof shows that the 
respondent company is seeking, through the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain, to take the property 
of these realtors not for its own us.e and benefit, but 
for the use and benefit of other corporations. We 
think this objection is wholly untenable. Under what 
agreement or understanding between the two com-
panies the respondent's railroad is used and operated 
by the Great Northern Railway Company, or upon 
what terms and conditions the cars of other railroad 
companies are or may be transported over its road, 
is not disclosed by the evidence; but, whatever the 
arrangement is under which this may be done, it 
cannot be presumed to be illegal. Indeed, it is not 
only the right, but the duty, of the Seattle & Mon-
tana Railroad Company, under the law and the Con-
stitution of this state, to permit such use of its road 
by other railroad compan~es. Ballinger's Ann. Codes 
& St. Sec. 4318; Const. art. 12, Sec. 13. And, if it be 
true that said company has leas-ed its railroad to the 
Great Northern Company, or any other company or 
companies, or agreed to do so, it is not thereby pre-
cluded from condemning and appropriating private 
property for a public use, which may be necessary for 
its tracks, side tracks, depots, etc. In re Metropolitan 
E. Ry. I Co., supra; Crolley v. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 541, 
16 N. W. 422; Mayor v. Railway Co., 109 Mass. 103; 
in reNew York, etc., R. Co., 99 N.Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27; 
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Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 113 Ill. 156. In 
Re Metropolitan Ry. Co., supra, it was objected that 
the condemnation proceedings could not be main-
tained by the petitioner bec.ause of the lease of its 
line of road to another company. Concerning the ob-
jection the court said: 'This object ion is not well 
founded, beca.use it ha.s been repea.tedly decided that 
the leasing of a. line of railu'ay corpo1·a.tion to another 
corporation does not deprive the for1ner of the power 
to exercise the right of e1ninent domain.' The Illinois 
case above cited ( 113 Ill. 156) is an interesting and 
instructive one, and is directly in point here, especial-
ly on the question of the power of a lessor railroad 
company to condemn private property for corporate 
purposes. In that case, as in this, the company seek-
ing to appropriate the property did not own any cars 
or locomotives, and did not transport passengers or 
freight, and had leased its line to other companies, 
and yet the court there held that it was not thereby 
deprived of the right to take property under the 
power of eminent domain." 
Beckman v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co. (Neb.), 112 N. W. 
348. The defendant railroad company had instituted con-
demnation proceedings in the county court against plaintiff. 
The county court had granted condemnation and given 
possession, and that case was appealed to the district court. 
While there pending on appeal, the plaintiff sued separately 
in the district court and secured an injunction against fur-
ther proceedings in the condemnation action and against 
further construction by the railroad. It appeared that the 
defendant railroad company was incorporated in 1879 to 
construct a railroad from Lincoln to Columbus, Nebraska, 
and thence to the north boundary of the state. It constructed 
the road from Lincoln to Columbus and the next year leased 
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its right of way and all of its property and franchises to the 
Burlington & Missouri River Ry. Co. for a period of 999 
years .. Thereafter, the Chicago, Burlington & Q. R. R. Co. 
purchased the road and properties of the Burlington & 
Missouri River Ry. Co., including the long-term lease of the 
defendant company. The properties of the defendant com-
pany were being operated by the Burlington under the lease 
at the time of the condemnation proceedings. 
On the appeal in the injunction suit the defendant rail-
road company contended that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to the relief by injunction but could only seek quo warranto. 
The supreme court did not agree with that contention, saying 
the plaintiff could proceed in equity because it could no·t ques-
tion the railroad company's right in the condemnation pro-
ceedings. We quote from the opinion: 
"* * * An appeal to the district court does 
not vacate or supersede the proceedings in the county 
court so as to prevent the railroad company from 
proceeding with the construction of its road upon the 
land, which may be completed and the road in opera-
tion before the matter is finally heard in the district 
court. Any relief that the district court might then 
afford cannot be said to he adequate. On the other 
hand, it is equally clear that the corporate existence 
of the defendant cannot be attacked, nor its right to 
exist and exercise its corporate franchises. challenged, 
by a private individual in this form of action." 
"The contention of the plaintiff is, in substance, 
that the defendant is not engaged in the construction 
of the line which crosses his land, but that the same is 
being constructed by the Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad Company for its own use and bene-
fit; that the nearest point on defendant's line of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
railroad is more than two miles from his premises; 
and that the condemnation proceedings. are not prose-
cuted in good faith for the proper use of the defend-
ant, and are in fraud of plaintiff's rights. The con-
tention of the plaintiff that 'a railroad company can-
not use its powers of eminent domain to acquire a 
right of way for another company's road' is mani-
festly right. * * * It clearly has no authority 
to take land for the use of another company in the 
construction of the road of the latter. No one would 
contend that this defendant company could go into 
a distant county of the state and condemn land for 
the construction of a road in which it would have 
no interest when constructed, a road that would be 
the property of another company and used exclusive-
ly by that other company. The Lincoln & Northwest-
ern Railway Company may condemn land necessary 
for the construction of its road, but it cannot con-
demn land for the construction of a road by and for 
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, 
or any other company; and the principal question in 
this case is whether this land is being taken for the 
construction of the road of the defendant in this 
action, or whether it is in fact being taken for the 
construction of the road of the Chicago, Burlington 
& Quincy Railroad Company." 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the road was 
the road of the defendant being built by it and reversed the 
trial court and dismissed the injunction. In connection with 
this case we wish to call the court's attention to the fact, as 
stated herein, that "a railroad company cannot use its 
powers of eminent domain to acquire a right of way for an-
other company's road." Therefore, the Union Pacific could 
not file and maintain an action to acquire a right of way 
which would become a part of the road owned by the Short 
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Line. The Union Pacific does not own the railroad properties 
involved herein and owns only the line of railroad extending 
east from Ogden, and we are sure that under this case and 
other similar law neither the Union Pacific nor anyone else 
"could go into a distant county of the state and condemn 
land for the construction of a road in which it would have 
no interest when constructed." Under the very terms of the 
lease itself, all "such additions, betterments and extensions 
made upon or to any part of the demised premises owned by 
the Lessor shall become and be a part of the demised premises 
and the property of the Lessor, and the Lessor shall reim-
burse the Lessee to the extent of the cost incurred by it 
therefor, chargeable to property investment accounts." The 
Short Line owns the railroad and will own the industry spur 
sought to be added here and is entitled to condemn and the 
one who should condemn. 
Riden v. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R. Co. 
( Md.), 35 A, 2d 99. The plaintiff sought to restrain and en-
join the defendant from condemning his land for a spur 
track to the Bowie race track. The defendant had leased 
all of its. road and properties to the Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company, which was operating them under such lease at the 
time condemnation was filed. The Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company did not have authority for eminent domain in the 
State of Maryland, and plaintiff contended because of the 
lease and the operation by the Pennsylvania Railroad that 
the plaintiff no longer had the right to condemn. The Mary-
land Appellate Court held otherwise. We quote from the 
court's opinion: 
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''It is an accepted doctrine that the po,Yer of 
eminent domain is inalienable, and any agency cloth-
ed by the State ,vith this sovereign power should hold 
it as a public trust to be exercised \Vhenever publil' 
necessity and convenience require it. It is according-
ly held that any contract which attempts. to impair 
the power of eminent domain is void as being con-
trary to public policy. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Union 
City, 137 Tenn. 491, 194 S. '""· 572; 18 Am. Jur., 
Eminent Domain, Sec. 25. It appears from the rec-
ord in this case that the Philadelphia, Baltimore & 
Washington Railroad Company, incorporated under 
the laws of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Delaware, 
leased its railroad lines and propel'ty to the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company, a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, for the term of 999 years, beginning January 
1, 1918. But the lessor expressly reserved its fran-
chise and any other right or privilege which may be 
necessary to preserve its corporate existence or 
organization, and receives from the lessee an annual 
rent suffj.cient to pay not only interest on bonds and 
dividends on stock, but also organization, administra-
tion and legal expenses. Thus it maintains its corpor-
ate identity and is continuing to fulfill its obligations 
to the State. It is evident that the lessor may find 
it necessary at any time to resort to the power of 
eminent domain in order to enlarge or improve the 
railroad system or to meet exigencies growing out 
of increased transportation. Under some circum-
stances it is conceivable that a loss of such power 
might be destructive of important rights in the oper-
ation of the road, and might render the lease almost 
valueless. In such an event the lessor would be un-
able to perform its. duty to the State. We therefore 
conclude that, except in case of fraud, a domestic rail-
road corporation does not divest itself of the power 
to condemn private property necessary for corporate 
purposes by leasing its lines and property to another 
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company, although the lessee itself may not have the 
right as a foreign corporation to exercse the power 
of eminent domain within this. State." 
' 
Robertson v. Brooksville & I. Ry. Co. (Fla.), 129 S. 582. 
This case involved condemnation proceedings instituted by 
the Brooksville & Inverness Ry. Corporation. The railroad 
and all of the railroad properties of the plaintiff had been 
leased to, and were being operated by, the Seaboard Airline 
Railway Company. Upon the question of the right of con-
demnation being raised as a result of this lease, the Supreme 
Court of Florida disposed of the matter with the following 
short paragraph : 
"It is well settled that a railroad company which 
has leased all of its property and franchises. can ex-
ercise the right of eminent domain for the acquisition 
of property necessary to the operation of the road by 
its. lessee. Elliot on Railroads, Third Edition, Section 
1212, and cases cited. And in New York it has been 
held that this principle is applicable even where the 
lease is for the period of the entire life of the corpora-
tion. Matter of N. Y., etc., R. Co., 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. 
E. 27." 
Snyder v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co·. (Pa.), 60 A._151. The 
Glenwood Railroad Company, a corporation organized under 
the general railroad acts of Pennsylvania, leased its road and 
properties to the Pittsburgh & Connelsville R. R. Co., also 
a Pennsylvania corporation. The latter then leased its entire 
road and properties, including the Glenwood lease, to the 
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., a corporation of the State of Mary-
land. 
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The Glenwood Railroad Company filed an action in con-
demnation to secure property for the purpose of widening 
its road. It '\Vas contended that the Glenwood company did 
not have the right to condemn nor was there any public 
necessity sho,vn, inasmuch as the Glenwood company owned 
no cars or motive po,Yer and had no need of increasing its 
facilities. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the 
right of the Glenwood company to prosecute an action in 
condemnation. Among other things, the Supreme Court 
said: 
"Assuredly its power to so appropriate could not 
be questioned if done for itself and it certainly does 
not cease to exist because its exercise might operate 
to the benefit of its lessees, who could properly re-
quest that the power be so exercised by the lessor to 
meet the exigencies growing out of the increased 
transportation." . 
See, also, Terre Haute & P.R. Co. v. Robbins (Ill.), 93 
N. E. 398, also a lease case, wherein it was contended that the 
lessor did not have the right to condemn and wherein, also, 
an attack was made upon the continued existence of the 
lessor company, with respect to which the Illinois Supreme 
Court said: 
"In a proceeding for the condemnation of real 
estate for railroad uses, the question of the de jure 
existence of the company cannot be determined. It 
is sufficient that the statute authorized the organiza-
tion of the corporation, and that the petitioner is a 
corporation de facto. Whether or not it has a legal 
existence as a corporation can only be determined 
by a direct proceeding-the writ of quo warranto. 
* * *" 
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"Railroad companies incorporated or organized 
under the laws of this state have the power to make 
contracts and arrangements with each other, and 
with railroad corporations of other states, for leas-
ing or renting their roads or any part thereof, and 
also to contract for and hold in fee simple or other-
wise, lands, or buildings in this or other states for 
depot purposes * * *. Railroads may thus be 
united and merged in a single line or two companies 
may arrange for the joint use of the same tracks. 
* * *. The contract between appellant and the 
Illinois Central R. R. Co. for the use of the latter's 
right of way and tracks between Maroa and Decatur 
Junction executed on November 14, 1894, for the 
period of 25 years, can be ended by either party on 
one year's notice. * * * 
"While it retained its. franchise, the question of 
whether or not it was improperly exercising such 
franchise· was one between it and the state. Any ques-
tion of illegal combination or arrangement entered 
into by it that might affect the franchise could only 
be raised by the people in a proceeding instituted for 
that purpose.'' 
We feel that that case has direct application to the case 
at bar because the respondent company is a railroad com-
pany incorporated under the laws of this state and was 
certified by the s.ecretary of state to be in good standing as 
of the date of the trial.. Being such a railroad corporation in 
good standing, it has, under the state laws, Section 77-0-5, 
the right to prosecute an action in condemnation to secure 
a right of way and also the right to lease its property or 
otherwise contract with other companies for operation of 
its road, just so long as the contract or lease is not with a 
railroad owning a competing line. The question as to whether 
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it is such a corporation, or 'vhether by its acts pursuant to 
such law it has ceased to be the type of corporation therein 
authorized, is something that cannot be attacked collaterally 
in this condemnation action, but the question as to whether 
it was or was not improperly exercising its franchise is one 
between it and the state, and upon that basis alone the judg-
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
See, also, Pine .i.llartin Jlhdng Co. v. Empire Zinc Co. 
(Colo.), 11 P. 2d 221; Peterson Orchard Co. v. Southwestern 
Ark. Utilities Corp. (Ark.), 18 S. W. 2d 1028; Renter v. 
Malin Water Co. (Ind.), 198 N. E. 442. 
In the various arguments had in the trial court, com-
mencing with the pretrial, counsel for plaintiff and respond-
ent cited to the court and to opposing counsel and referred 
to several of the cases herein cited and set forth wherein 
railroad corporations, which had leased their properties 
similar to what plaintiff and respondent has done here, were 
nevertheless held to be entitled to prosecute condemnation 
actions in their own names. In spite of the fact that this was 
litigated as a major issue in the trial court and is really the· 
issue here, and in spite of the fact that plaintiff and respond-
ent cited such cases giving appellant's counsel access there-
to, appellant has not seen fit to cite any contrary case, and 
we therefore conclude that he has found none. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutes and laws of the State of Utah do not give 
the right of condemnation to a common carrier, and nowhere 
in those laws is it stated or even inferred that a corporation 
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(or individual) must show itself to he a common carrier as 
a prerequisite to entitle it to condemnation. Nevertheless, 
we think it must be concluded in this case that the Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Company is a common carrier, with its 
property being handled by, and its duties as such common 
carrier being performed by, the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany as substitute or agent for it pursuant to the lease con-
tract, as so stated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 
232 U. S. 248, 58 L. Ed. 591, 34 S. Ct. 305. Also, the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah makes it a common carrier and 
places duties and responsibilities upon it as such and by 
virtue of its state charter which it cannot escape by lease, or 
otherwise, pursuant to constitutional mandate, and which 
duties and responsibilities are in no manner lessened or re-
lieved by its lease with the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company is a railroad 
corporation organized under the laws of this state and is 
such a corporation in good standing under the laws of the 
State of Utah, and as such is specifically given the power 
and the authority to condemn, and by the same law and by 
the same section given the right and authority to lease its 
properties to a non-competitive railroad company. 
The authorities, aside from our Utah statutes and state 
constitution, are without dissent and are conclusive in hold-
ing that a railroad corporation, such as the plaintiff and 
respondent herein, still retains its right to bring and prose-
cute actions in eminent domain, in spite of and after having 
leased. its properties to another railroad company for opera-
tion, whether such lease is for one year and from year to 
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year, as with the Short Line lease involved in this case, or 
whether such lease is for the entire life of the corporation. 
The property being condemned by plaintiff and re-
spondent by virtue of the lease will become a part of the 
property owned by the Short Line and is contiguous to such 
Short Line properties and therefore could not be condemned 
for it by any other corporation, and the use proposed and 
for which the plaintiff and respondent sought the property 
herein being condemned was and is a public use authorized 
by law, and the trial court found and concluded that it was 
a proper public use authorized by law, and the appellant has 
not attacked said finding nor certified proper parts of the 
record to this court in any frank attempt to show that the 
trial court may have erred in such finding or conclusion. 
Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial court, 
and the whole thereof, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRO·NSON, 
A. U. MIN,ER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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